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Abstract
We consider one-to-one matching markets in which agents can either be matched as pairs
or remain single. In these so-called roommate markets agents are consumers and resources
at the same time. We investigate two new properties that capture the effect a newcomer
has on incumbent agents. Competition sensitivity focuses on the newcomer as additional
consumer and requires that some incumbents will suffer if competition is caused by a new-
comer. Resource sensitivity focuses on the newcomer as additional resource and requires
that this is beneficial for some incumbents. For solvable roommate markets, we provide
the first characterizations of the core using either competition or resource sensitivity. On
the class of all roommate markets, we obtain two associated impossibility results.
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1 Introduction
We consider one-to-one matching markets in which agents can either be matched as pairs or
remain single. These markets are known as roommate markets and they include as special
cases the well-known marriage markets (Gale and Shapley, 1962; Roth and Sotomayor, 1990).
As simple as the roommate model may be, it is of conceptual importance as it lies in the
intersection of network and coalition formation models1 (for surveys and current research of
network and coalition formation see Demange and Wooders, 2004).
Loosely speaking, in these discrete markets the commodities to be traded are the agents
themselves. Thus, agents are consumers and resources at the same time. We investigate two
new properties that capture the effect a newcomer has on incumbent agents: competition and
resource sensitivity. Competition sensitivity focuses on the newcomer as additional consumer
and requires that some incumbents will suffer if competition is caused because the newcomer
initiates new trades. Resource sensitivity focuses on the newcomer as additional resource and
requires that some incumbents will benefit if there are new trades, i.e., the extra resource is
consumed.
For marriage markets, both properties are closely related to population monotonicity, a
solidarity property that requires that additional agents affect the incumbents in a similar
way (either all incumbents are weakly better off or all incumbents are weakly worse off).
Because of the polarization of interests that occurs in marriage markets, two specific versions
of population monotonicity exist: own-side and other-side population monotonicity (Toda,
2006, indroduced the first of these specifications).2 We show that in marriage markets, es-
sentially own-side population monotonicity implies competition sensitivity (Lemma 1) and
other-side population monotonicity implies resource sensitivity (Lemma 2). Our main results
are two characterizations of the core by unanimity3, Maskin monotonicity4, and either compe-
tition or resource sensitivity for solvable roommate markets (Theorem 1) and two associated
impossibility results on the general domain (Theorem 2).
Theorem 1 presents the first characterizations of the core for solvable roommate markets.
One of Toda’s (2006, Theorem 3.1) results can be interpreted as a corollary (Corollary 1) of our
results. More importantly, Theorem 1 demonstrates that it is not really a solidarity property
(population monotonicity) that is at work in Toda’s (2006) characterization of the core for
marriage markets, but that it is the competition sensitivity aspect that is captured as well.
Our results also imply a new characterization of the core for marriage markets (Corollary 2): a
solution ϕ satisfies unanimity, Maskin monotonicity, and other-side population monotonicity
if and only if it equals the core.
1In a “roommate network” situation each agent is allowed or able to form only one link and in a “roommate
coalition” situation only coalitions of size one or two can be formed.
2Own-side population monotonicity : if additional men (women) enter the market, then all incumbent men
(women) are weakly worse off.
Other-side population monotonicity : if additional men (women) enter the market, then all incumbent women
(men) are weakly better off.
3Unanimity : if a unanimously best matching exists, then it is chosen.
4Maskin monotonicity : if a matching is chosen in one market, then it is also chosen in a market that results
from a Maskin monotonic transformation (which essentially means that the matching improved in the ranking
of all agents).
2
2 Roommate Markets
2.1 The Model
Gale and Shapley (1962, Example 3) introduced the very simple and appealing roommate
markets as follows: “An even number of boys wish to divide up into pairs of roommates.”
A very common extension of this problem is to allow also for odd numbers of agents and to
consider the formation of pairs and singletons (rooms can be occupied either by one or by two
agents). In addition, we will extend the problem to variable sets of agents, e.g., because the
allocation of dormitory rooms at a university occurs every year for different sets of students.
Let N be the set of potential agents5 and N be the set of all non-empty finite subsets of N,
i.e., N = {N ⊆ N | ∞ > |N | > 0}. For N ∈ N , L(N) denotes the set of all linear orders over
N .6 For i ∈ N , we interpret Ri ∈ L(N) as agent i’s preferences over sharing a room with any
of the agents in N\{i} and having a room for himself; e.g., Ri : j, k, i, l means that i would
first like to share a room with j, then with k, and then i would prefer to stay alone rather
than sharing the room with l. If j Pi i then agent i finds agent j acceptable and if i Pi j then
agent i finds agent j unacceptable. RN = ∏N L(N) denotes the set of all preference profiles
of agents in N (over agents in N). A roommate market consists of a set of agents N ∈ N and
their preferences R ∈ RN and is denoted by (N,R). A marriage market (Gale and Shapley,
1962) is a roommate market (N,R) such that N is the union of two disjoint sets M and W ,
and each agent in M (respectively W ) prefers being single to being matched with any other
agent in M (respectively W ).
A matching µ for roommate market (N,R) is a function µ : N → N of order two, i.e., for
all i ∈ N , µ(µ(i)) = i. Thus, at any matching µ, the set of agents is partitioned into pairs
of agents who share a room and singletons (agents who do not share a room). Agent µ(i) is
agent i’s match (if µ(i) = i then i is matched to himself or single). For marriage markets, a
matching never matches two men or two women (the partition consists of man-woman pairs
and singletons). For S ⊆ N , we denote by µ(S) the set of agents that are matched to agents
in S, i.e., µ(S) = {i ∈ N | µ−1(i) ∈ S}. We denote the set of matchings for roommate
market (N,R) by M(N,R) (even though this set does not depend on preferences R). If it
is clear which roommate market (N,R) we refer to, matchings are assumed to be elements
of M(N,R). We use the same notation for preferences over agents and matchings: for all
agents i ∈ N and matchings µ, µ′, µ Ri µ′ if and only if µ(i)Ri µ′(i).
A solution ϕ is a correspondence that associates with each roommate market (N,R) a
nonempty subset of matchings, i.e., for all (N,R), ϕ(N,R) ⊆M(N,R) and ϕ(N,R) 6= ∅.
2.2 Basic Properties and the Core
We first introduce a voluntary participation condition based on the idea that no agent can
be forced to share a room.
5Only Lemma 3, Theorems 1 (a), 2 (a), and Corollary 1 depend on the set of potential agents to be infinite.
Propositions 1, 2, Lemmas 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, Theorems 1 (b), 2 (b), and Corollary 2 are also valid for a finite set
of potential agents.
6A linear order over N is a binary relation R¯ that satisfies antisymmetry (for all i, j ∈ N , if i R¯ j and j R¯ i,
then i = j), transitivity (for all i, j, k ∈ N , if i R¯ j and j R¯ k, then i R¯ k), and comparability (for all i, j ∈ N ,
i R¯ j or j R¯ i). By P¯ we denote the asymmetric part of R¯. Hence, given i, j ∈ N , i P¯ j means that i is strictly
preferred to j; i R¯ j means that i P¯ j or i = j and that i is weakly preferred to j.
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Definition 1. Individual Rationality
A matching µ is individually rational for roommate market (N,R) if for all i ∈ N , µ(i) Ri i.
IR(N,R) denotes the set of all individually rational matchings for roommate market (N,R).
A solution ϕ is individually rational if it only assigns individually rational matchings, i.e., for
all (N,R), ϕ(N,R) ⊆ IR(N,R).
Next, we introduce the well-known condition of Pareto optimality and the weaker condition
of unanimity.
Definition 2. Pareto Optimality
A matching µ is Pareto optimal for roommate market (N,R) if there is no other matching
µ′ ∈M(N,R) such that for all i ∈ N , µ′Ri µ and for some j ∈ N , µ′ Pj µ. PO(N,R) denotes
the set of all Pareto optimal matchings for roommate market (N,R). A solution ϕ is Pareto
optimal if it only assigns Pareto optimal matchings, i.e., for all (N,R), ϕ(N,R) ⊆ PO(N,R).
Definition 3. Unanimity
Let (N,R) be a roommate market and µ be such that for all i, j ∈ N , µ(i) Ri j. Then, µ
is the unanimously best matching for (N,R). A solution ϕ is unanimous if it assigns the
unanimously best matching whenever it exists, i.e., for all roommate markets (N,R) with an
unanimously best matching µ, ϕ(N,R) = {µ}.
Throughout the paper we could also use a somewhat weaker version of unanimity: a
solution ϕ is weakly unanimous if it chooses the unanimously best matching whenever it
exists and is complete (no agent is single). We define weak unanimity and show how the
relevant proofs (the proofs of Lemmas 3 and 4) should be adjusted in Appendix C. Note that
Pareto optimality implies unanimity and that unanimity implies weak unanimity.
The next property requires that two agents who are “mutually best agents” are always
matched with each others.
Definition 4. Mutually Best
Let (N,R) be a roommate market and i, j ∈ N [possibly i = j] such that for all k ∈ N , iRj k
and j Ri k. Then, i and j are mutually best agents for (N,R). A solution ϕ is mutually best if
it only assigns matchings at which all mutually best agents are matched, i.e., for all roommate
markets (N,R), for all mutually best agents i and j, and for all µ ∈ ϕ(N,R), µ(i) = j.
Note that mutually best implies unanimity and that Pareto optimality and mutually best
are logically unrelated.
Examples of solutions are implied by two of the properties: define IR (respectively PO)
as correspondences that assign to each roommate market the set of individually rational
(respectively Pareto optimal) matchings. Another well-known solution is the core.
Definition 5. Core
Amatching is in the (strict or strong) core if no coalition of agents can improve their welfare by
rematching among themselves. For roommate market (N,R), core(N,R) = {µ ∈ M(N,R) |
there exists no S ⊆ N and no µ′ ∈ M(N,R) such that µ′(S) = S, for all i ∈ S, µ′(i) Ri
µ(i), and for some j ∈ S, µ′(j) Pj µ(j)}.
Next, we define stability for roommate markets. A matching µ is blocked by a pair
{i, j} ⊆ N [possibly i = j] if j Pi µ(i) and i Pj µ(j). If {i, j} blocks µ, then {i, j} is called a
blocking pair for µ. Note that a matching is individually rational if there is no blocking pair
{i, j} with i = j.
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Definition 6. Stability
A matching µ is stable for roommate market (N,R) if there is no blocking pair for µ. S(N,R)
denotes the set of all stable matchings for roommate market (N,R). A solution ϕ is stable if
it only assigns stable matchings, i.e., for all (N,R), ϕ(N,R) ⊆ S(N,R).
Similarly as in other matching models (e.g., marriage markets and college admissions
markets), the core equals the set of stable matchings, i.e., for all (N,R), core(N,R) = S(N,R).
A roommate market is solvable if stable/core matchings exist. Gale and Shapley (1962)
showed that all marriage markets are solvable and gave an example of an unsolvable roommate
market (Gale and Shapley, 1962, Example 3).
Finally, we introduce Maskin monotonicity (Maskin, 1999): if a matching is chosen in one
roommate market, then it is also chosen in a roommate market that results from a Maskin
monotonic transformation, which essentially means that the matching (weakly) improved in
the preference ranking of all agents.
Let (N,R) be a roommate market. Then, for any agent i ∈ N and matching µ ∈M(N,R),
the lower contour set of Ri at µ is Li(Ri, µ) := {µ′ ∈ M(N,R) | µ Ri µ′}. For preference
profiles R,R′ ∈ RN and matching µ ∈ M(N,R), R′ is a Maskin monotonic transformation
of R at µ if for all i ∈ N , Li(Ri, µ) ⊆ Li(R′i, µ).
Definition 7. Maskin Monotonicity
A solution ϕ is Maskin monotonic if for all roommate markets (N,R), (N,R′), and all µ ∈
ϕ(N,R) such that R′ is a Maskin monotonic transformation of R at µ, µ ∈ ϕ(N,R′).
Maskin monotonicity is one of the key concepts in implementation theory. However, here
we focus on Maskin monotonicity as a desirable property in itself.
Proposition 1. On the class of solvable roommate markets, the core satisfies individual
rationality, Pareto optimality, unanimity, mutually best, stability, and Maskin monotonicity.
Proof. It is easily checked that the core satisfies individual rationality, Pareto optimality,
unanimity, mutually best, and stability. So¨nmez (1996, Proposition 1) showed that the core
is Maskin monotonic.
2.3 Variable Population Properties
The next properties we consider concern population changes. More specifically, consider the
change of a roommate market (N,R) when one new agent, a newcomer n ∈ N\N , shows up.
Then, the new set of agents is N ′ = N ∪{n} and (N ′, R′), R′ ∈ RN ′ , is an extension of (N,R)
if agents in N extend their preferences to include n, i.e.,
(i) for all i ∈ N ′, R′i ∈ L(N ′) and
(ii) for all j, k, l ∈ N , j Rl k if and only if j R′l k.
Note that R ∈ RN is the restriction of R′ ∈ RN ′ to N . We also denote the restriction of R′
to N by R′|N .
Adding an agent n might be a positive or a negative change for any of the incumbents in N
because it might mean
a negative change with more competition or
a positive change with more resources.
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Before we capture both effects in two new properties called competition and resource sensi-
tivity, we make a short excursion to the definition of population monotonicity for marriage
markets. This property goes back to Thomson (1983), who also presents a survey of popula-
tion monotonicity in various economic models (Thomson, 1995).
Population Monotonicity: When a change in the population is exogenous, it would be
unfair if the agents who were not responsible for this change were treated unequally. Pop-
ulation monotonicity represents this idea of solidarity. However, for marriage markets this
would mean that if a newcomer enters (e.g., a man) men and women are all affected in the
same way (all weakly better off or all weakly worse off).
This might not be a natural condition for marriage markets because of a certain polar-
ization imbedded in the market: a man might be considered good news for women (more
choice), but bad news for men (more competition). Therefore, for marriage markets we can
formulate two population monotonicity conditions that take the polarization aspect into ac-
count. The first one was introduced by Toda (2006) and we will refer to it as own-side
population monotonicity: a solution ϕ is own-side population monotonic if for any marriage
market (M ∪W,R), if additional men [women] enter the market such that the new marriage
market equals (M ′∪W,R′) [(M∪W ′, R′)], then – because of the possible negative effect of the
extra competition – all men in M [women in W ] weakly prefer ϕ(M ∪W,R) to ϕ(M ′∪W,R′)
[ϕ(M ∪W ′, R′)].
We formalize a somewhat weaker version of own-side population monotonicity by restrict-
ing population changes to one agent at a time. Consistent with Toda’s (2006) choice of
extending preferences over matchings to sets of matchings, we apply the pessimistic view of
comparing sets of matchings.7
Definition 8. Own-Side Population Monotonicity for Marriage Markets
A solution ϕ is own-side population monotonic if the following holds. Let (N,R) be a marriage
market and assume that (N ′, R′), N ′ = N ∪{n}, is an extension of (N,R) and the newcomer
n is a man [woman]. Then, for all µ ∈ ϕ(N,R) there exists µ′ ∈ ϕ(N ′, R′) such that (∗) for
all men m ∈ N , µ(m)Rm µ′(m) [for all women w ∈ N , µ(w)Rw µ′(w)].
By the strictness of preferences, (∗) means that if the newcomer is a man [woman], then
every man [woman] who is matched differently is strictly worse off, i.e., for all men m ∈ N ,
either µ(m) = µ′(m) or µ(m) Pm µ′(m) [for all women w ∈ N , either µ(w) = µ′(w) or
µ(w) Pw µ′(w)]. Hence, if a man m [woman w] has a new mate at µ′, then he [she] is worse
off. Without specifying whether the newcomer is a man or a woman, own-side population
monotonicity implies that if m,w ∈ N are new mates at µ′, then at least one of them is worse
off (if the newcomer is a man, then man m is worse off and if the newcomer is a woman, then
woman w is worse off). This latter requirement that if two incumbents are newly matched
at µ′, then one of them suffers from the increased competition by the newcomer and is worse
off, can be formulated as a new property, namely competition sensitivity. This property
requires that the solution is sensitive to competition, which is a different requirement than
the solidarity aspect that own-side population monotonicity reflects.
7Agents are pessimistic and always assume that the worst matching will be realized, i.e., given two sets of
matchings A and B, an agent will compare the worst matching in A to the worst matching in B. Thus, if
agent i weakly prefers A to B, then for all µ ∈ A there exists µ′ ∈ B such that µ Ri µ′.
As already noted by Toda (2006), using an optimistic set comparison, i.e., comparing the best matchings,
will not give the same results and using a standard set comparison that compares best to best and worst to
worst matchings (see Barbera` et al., 2004) will not change the results.
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Definition 9. Competition Sensitivity
A solution ϕ is competition sensitive if the following holds. Let (N,R) be a roommate market
and assume that (N ′, R′), N ′ = N ∪{n}, is an extension of (N,R). Then, for all µ ∈ ϕ(N,R)
there exists µ′ ∈ ϕ(N ′, R′) such that for all i, j ∈ N [possibly i = j] that are new mates at
µ′ at least one is worse off, i.e., if i, j ∈ N , µ(i) 6= j, and µ′(i) = j, then µ(i) Pi µ′(i) or
µ(j) Pj µ′(j).
On the class of marriage markets, competition sensitivity is essentially a weaker property
than own-side population monotonicity.
Lemma 1. Own-Side Population Monotonicity ⇒ Competition Sensitivity
On the class of marriage markets, individual rationality and own-side population monotonicity
imply competition sensitivity.
Proof. Let ϕ be a solution that is individually rational and own-side population monotonic
on the class of marriage markets. Let (N,R) be a marriage market and assume that (N ′, R′),
N ′ = N ∪ {n}, is an extension of (N,R). Without loss of generality assume that n is a man.
By own-side population monotonicity, for all µ ∈ ϕ(N,R) there exists µ′ ∈ ϕ(N ′, R′) such
that for all men m ∈ N , either µ(m) = µ′(m) or µ(m) Pm µ′(m). Let i, j ∈ N , µ(i) 6= j,
and µ′(i) = j. If i 6= j, then the pair {i, j} consists of one man and one woman. Without
loss of generality assume that i is the man and j the woman. Thus, by own-side population
monotonicity, µ(i)Pi µ′(i). If i = j, then, by individual rationality, µ(i)Pi µ′(i).8 Hence, ϕ is
competition sensitive.
In the following example we demonstrate that for marriage markets, competition sensi-
tivity is indeed a weaker condition than own-side population monotonicity.
Example 1. Assume, without loss of generality, that there exist women w1, w2 ∈ N and
men m1,m2 ∈ N such that w1 < m1 and m2 < w2. Solution ϕ¯ uses two important stable
matchings that always exist for marriage markets: the man- and the woman-optimal stable
matching (obtainable by applying the deferred acceptance algorithm, cf., Gale and Shapley,
1962). We define ϕ¯ as follows. For all marriage markets (N,R), if the agent with the largest
index is a man, then ϕ¯ assigns the man-optimal stable matching and otherwise ϕ¯ assigns the
woman-optimal stable matching. Solution ϕ¯ is individually rational and competition sensitive
(see Proposition 2), but it violates own-side population-monotonicity (see Appendix A). 
Next we introduce other-side population monotonicity for marriage markets: a solution
ϕ is other-side population monotonic if for any marriage market (M ∪W,R), if additional
men [women] enter the market such that the new marriage market equals (M ′∪W,R′) [(M ∪
W ′, R′)], then – because of the possible positive effect of the extra matching opportunities
or resources – all women in W [men in M ] weakly prefer ϕ(M ′ ∪W,R′) [ϕ(M ∪W ′, R′)] to
ϕ(M ∪W,R).
Again, we formalize a somewhat weaker version of other-side population monotonicity by
restricting population changes to one agent at a time.
8If i is a man, this latter implication would also be implied by own-side population monotonicity. However,
if i is a woman, this concluding argument cannot be made solely by using own-side population monotonicity.
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Definition 10. Other-Side Population Monotonicity for Marriage Markets
A solution ϕ is other-side population monotonic if the following holds. Let (N,R) be a
marriage market and assume that (N ′, R′), N ′ = N ∪ {n}, is an extension of (N,R) and the
newcomer n is a man [woman]. Then, for all µ′ ∈ ϕ(N ′, R′) there exists µ ∈ ϕ(N,R) such
that (∗∗) for all women w ∈ N , µ′(w)Rw µ(w) [for all men m ∈ N , µ′(m)Rm µ(m)].
By the strictness of preferences, (∗∗) means that if the newcomer is a man [woman], then
every woman [man] who is matched differently is strictly better off, i.e., for all women w ∈ N ,
either µ′(w) = µ(w) or µ′(w) Pw µ(w) [for all men m ∈ N , either µ′(m) = µ(m) or µ′(m) Pm
µ(m)]. Hence, if a woman w [man m] is unmatched from her mate at µ, then she [he] is better
off. Without specifying whether the newcomer is a man or a woman, other-side population
monotonicity implies that if m,w ∈ N are not matched anymore at µ′, then at least one of
them is better off (if the newcomer is a man, then woman w is better off and if the newcomer
is a woman, then man m is better off). This latter requirement that if two incumbents were
unmatched at µ′, then one of them benefits from the increase of resources by the newcomer
and is better off, can be formulated as a new property, namely resource sensitivity. This
property requires that the solution is sensitive to an increase in resources, which is a different
requirement than the solidarity aspect that other-side population monotonicity reflects.
Definition 11. Resource Sensitivity
A solution ϕ is resource sensitive if the following holds. Let (N,R) be a roommate market and
assume that (N ′, R′), N ′ = N ∪ {n}, is an extension of (N,R). Then, for all µ′ ∈ ϕ(N ′, R′)
there exists µ ∈ ϕ(N,R) such that for all i, j ∈ N [possibly i = j] that were mates at µ at
least one is better off, i.e., if i, j ∈ N , µ(i) = j, and µ′(i) 6= j, then µ′(i)Piµ(i) or µ′(j)Pjµ(j).
On the class of marriage markets, resource sensitivity is essentially a weaker property than
other-side population monotonicity.
Lemma 2. Other-Side Population Monotonicity ⇒ Resource Sensitivity
On the class of marriage markets, individual rationality and other-side population monotonic-
ity imply resource sensitivity.
Proof. Let ϕ be a solution that is individually rational and other-side population monotonic
on the class of marriage markets. Let (N,R) be a marriage market and assume that (N ′, R′),
N ′ = N ∪ {n}, is an extension of (N,R). Without loss of generality assume that n is a man.
By other-side population monotonicity, for all µ′ ∈ ϕ(N ′, R′) there exists µ ∈ ϕ(N,R) such
that for all women w ∈ N , either µ′(w) = µ(w) or µ′(w) Pw µ(w). Let i, j ∈ N , µ(i) = j,
and µ′(i) 6= j. If i 6= j, then the pair {i, j} consists of one man and one woman. Without
loss of generality assume that i is the man and j the woman. Thus, by other-side population
monotonicity, µ′(j) Pj µ(j). If i = j , then by individual rationality, µ′(i) Pi µ(i).9 Hence, ϕ
is resource sensitive.
Solution ϕ¯ (Example 1) also demonstrates that for marriage markets, resource sensitivity
is indeed a weaker condition than other-side population monotonicity: solution ϕ¯ is individ-
ually rational and resource sensitive (see Proposition 2), but it violates other-side population
monotonicity (see Appendix A).
9If i is a woman, this latter implication would also be implied by other-side population monotonicity. How-
ever, if i is a man, this concluding argument cannot be made solely by using other-side population monotonicity.
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Proposition 2. On the class of solvable roommate markets, any stable solution satisfies
competition and resource sensitivity. In particular, the core satisfies competition and resource
sensitivity.
Proof. Let ϕ be a stable solution. Let (N,R) be a solvable roommate market and assume
that (N ′, R′), N ′ = N ∪ {n}, is an extension of (N,R) that is solvable.
Competition Sensitivity: Assume that the ϕ is not competition sensitive, i.e., there exist
µ ∈ ϕ(N,R), µ′ ∈ ϕ(N ′, R′), and i, j ∈ N such that µ′(i) = j, µ(i) 6= j, µ′(i) Pi µ(i), and
µ′(j) Pj µ(j). But then {i, j} is a blocking pair for µ; contradicting µ ∈ ϕ(N,R) ⊆ S(N,R).
Resource Sensitivity: Assume that the ϕ is not resource sensitive, i.e., there exist µ ∈ ϕ(N,R),
µ′ ∈ ϕ(N ′, R′), and i, j ∈ N such that µ(i) = j, µ′(i) 6= j, µ(i)Pi µ′(i), and µ(j)Pj µ′(j). But
then {i, j} is a blocking pair for µ′; contradicting µ′ ∈ ϕ(N ′, R′) ⊆ S(N ′, R′).
Remark 1. A Straightforward Extension of Population Monotonicity?
One might also consider the following “straightforward” extension of the two population
monotonicity properties from marriage to roommate markets.
A solution ϕ is “own-side population monotonic (?)” if for all roommate markets (N,R),
all newcomers n such that (N ′, R′) is the roommate market obtained, all agents in N that
find the newcomer n unacceptable weakly prefer ϕ(N,R) to ϕ(N ′, R′).
A solution ϕ is “other-side population monotonic (?)” if for all roommate markets (N,R),
all newcomers n such that (N ′, R′) is the roommate market obtained, all agents in N that
find the newcomer n acceptable weakly prefer ϕ(N ′, R′) to ϕ(N,R).
The problem with this simple generalization of population monotonicity is that it is not
clear which interesting solutions satisfy it: in Appendix B we demonstrate that no solu-
tion satisfying Pareto optimality and mutually best satisfies the straightforward population
monotonicity extension discussed here. 4
3 Results
The following preference transformations will be used frequently in subsequent proofs.
Let i, j ∈ N [possibly i = j] and Ri ∈ L(N). Then, Rji ∈ L(N) is obtained from Ri by
making j the best match without changing the order over agents in N \ {j}, i.e., Rji is such
that for all k ∈ N , j Rji k and for all l,m ∈ N \ {j}, l Rji m if and only if l Ri m.
Let i ∈ N , j /∈ N , N ′ = N ∪ {j}, and Ri ∈ L(N). Then, Rji ∈ L(N ′) is obtained from Ri
by making the newcomer j the best match without changing the order over agents in N , i.e.,
Rji is such that for all k ∈ N , j P ji k and for all l,m ∈ N , l Rji m if and only if l Ri m.
3.1 Relations between Properties
Lemma 3.
(a) On the class of solvable roommate markets, unanimity, Maskin monotonicity, and com-
petition sensitivity imply mutually best.
(b) On the class of all roommate markets, unanimity, Maskin monotonicity, and competition
sensitivity imply mutually best.
9
Lemma 3 holds without using Maskin monotonicity. However, the proof without Maskin
monotonicity is more involved (the problem without Maskin monotonicity occurs in the proof
of Lemma 3 (a) where in each step the solvability of the constructed roommate market
has to be guaranteed). Here we present the proof of Lemma 3 using Maskin monotonicity.
In Appendix C we prove a stronger version of Lemma 3 using only weak unanimity and
competition sensitivity. There, we also illustrate the complication that occurs without Maskin
monotonicity in the following proof by means of an example.
Proof. Assume that ϕ satisfies unanimity, Maskin monotonicity, and competition sensitiv-
ity, but not mutually best. Thus, there exists a (solvable) roommate market (N,R) and a
matching µ ∈ ϕ(N,R) such that for two agents i and j that are mutually best, µ(i) 6= j.
We define R˜ ∈ RN as follows. For any k ∈ N \ {i, j} we define R˜k ∈ L(N) by moving
µ(k) on top of agent k’s preferences, i.e., for all k ∈ N \ {i, j}, R˜k = Rµ(k)k . Let R˜i = Ri and
R˜j = Rj . Note that (N, R˜) is solvable10 and that R˜ is a Maskin monotonic transformation
of R at µ. Hence, by Maskin monotonicity, µ ∈ ϕ(N, R˜). Without loss of generality assume
that µ(i) ∈ N \ {i} or µ(j) ∈ N \ {j} (otherwise set (Nˆ , Rˆ) = (N, R˜) and move to the last
paragraph of the proof).
If µ(i) ∈ N \ {i}, consider the extension (N¯ , R¯) of (N, R˜) that is obtained by adding a
newcomer k¯ such that µ(i) and k¯ are mutually best and k¯ is unacceptable for all other agents
l ∈ N \ {µ(i)}, i.e., N¯ = N ∪ {k¯} and R¯ ∈ RN¯ is such that R¯µ(i) = R˜k¯µ(i), for all k ∈ N¯ ,
µ(i) R¯k¯ k, and for all l ∈ N \ {µ(i)}, l P¯l k¯. Note that (N¯ , R¯) is solvable.11 By competition
sensitivity, for µ ∈ ϕ(N, R˜), there exists µ¯ ∈ ϕ(N¯ , R¯) such that for all i′, j′ ∈ N [possibly
i′ = j′] that are new mates at µ¯ at least one is worse off. Hence, there exists µ¯ ∈ ϕ(N¯ , R¯)
such that µ¯(i) 6= j. If µ(i) = i set (N¯ , R¯) = (N, R˜) and µ¯ = µ.
If µ(j) ∈ N \ {j}, consider the extension (Nˆ , Rˆ) of (N¯ , R¯) that is obtained by adding a
newcomer kˆ such that µ(j) and kˆ are mutually best and kˆ is unacceptable for all other agents
l ∈ N¯ \ {µ(j)}, i.e., Nˆ = N¯ ∪ {kˆ} and Rˆ ∈ RNˆ is such that Rˆµ(j) = R¯kˆµ(j), for all k ∈ Nˆ ,
µ(j) Rˆkˆ k, and for all l ∈ N¯ \ {µ(j)}, l Pˆl kˆ. Note that (Nˆ , Rˆ) is solvable.12 By competition
sensitivity, for µ¯ ∈ ϕ(N¯ , R¯), there exists µˆ ∈ ϕ(Nˆ , Rˆ) such that for all i′, j′ ∈ N [possibly
i′ = j′] that are new mates at µˆ at least one is worse off. Hence, there exists µˆ ∈ ϕ(Nˆ , Rˆ)
such that µˆ(i) 6= j. If µ(j) = j set (Nˆ , Rˆ) = (N¯ , R¯) and µˆ = µ¯.
By construction, there now exists a unanimously best matching ν for (Nˆ , Rˆ): ν matches
agent i with agent j, agent µ(i) with agent k¯ (if µ(i) ∈ N \ {i}), agent µ(j) with agent kˆ
(if µ(j) ∈ N \ {j}), and all agents in Nˆ \ {i, j, µ(i), k¯, µ(j), kˆ} according to µ. Hence, by
unanimity, ϕ(Nˆ , Rˆ) = {ν}, contradicting µˆ ∈ ϕ(Nˆ , Rˆ).
10Roommate market (N, R˜) has a unique core allocation that matches agent i with agent j and all agents
in N \ {i, j, µ(i), µ(j)} according to µ – agent(s) µ(i) and µ(j) are either single or, if mutually acceptable,
matched with each other.
11Roommate market (N¯ , R¯) has a unique core allocation that matches agent i with agent j, agent µ(i) with
agent k¯, and all agents in N¯ \ {i, j, µ(i), k¯, µ(j)} according to µ – agent µ(j) is single.
12Roommate market (Nˆ , Rˆ) has a unique core allocation that matches agent i with agent j, agent µ(i) with
agent k¯, agent µ(j) with agent kˆ, and all agents in Nˆ \ {i, j, µ(i), k¯, µ(j), kˆ} according to µ.
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Lemma 4.
(a) On the class of solvable roommate markets, unanimity, Maskin monotonicity, and re-
source sensitivity imply mutually best.
(b) On the class of all roommate markets, unanimity, Maskin monotonicity, and resource
sensitivity imply mutually best.
It is an open question whether Lemma 4 holds on the domain of solvable roommate
markets without using Maskin monotonicity. We discuss the reason why the proof strategy
used to strengthen Lemma 3 by dropping Maskin monotonicity will not work for Lemma 4 in
Appendix C. Interestingly, this illustrates that competition and resource sensitivity are not
as symmetric as our main results suggest. In Appendix C we also illustrate the complication
that occurs without Maskin monotonicity in the following proof by means of an example.
Proof. Assume that ϕ satisfies unanimity, Maskin monotonicity, and resource sensitivity, but
not mutually best. Thus, there exists a (solvable) roommate market (N,R) and a matching
µ ∈ ϕ(N,R) such that agents i and j are mutually best and µ(i) 6= j.
We define R˜ ∈ RN as follows. For any k ∈ N \ {i, j} we define R˜k ∈ L(N) by moving
µ(k) on top of agent k’s preferences, i.e., for all k ∈ N \ {i, j}, R˜k = Rµ(k)k . Let R˜i = Ri and
R˜j = Rj . Note that (N, R˜) is solvable10 and that R˜ is a Maskin monotonic transformation of
R at µ. Hence, by Maskin monotonicity, µ ∈ ϕ(N, R˜).
Let N¯ = [N \ {µ(i), µ(j)}] ∪ {i, j} and define R¯ ∈ RN¯ as the reduction of R˜ to N¯ , i.e.,
R¯ = R˜|N¯ . There exists a unanimously best matching ν¯ for (N¯ , R¯): ν¯ matches agent i with
agent j and all agents in N¯ \ {i, j} according to µ. Hence, by unanimity, ϕ(N¯ , R¯) = {ν¯}.
Without loss of generality assume that µ(i) ∈ N \ {i} or µ(j) ∈ N \ {j} (otherwise (N¯ , R¯) =
(N, R˜) and ϕ(N¯ , R¯) = {ν¯} contradicts µ ∈ ϕ(N, R˜)).
If µ(i) ∈ N \ {i}, consider the extension (Nˆ , Rˆ) of (N¯ , R¯) such that Nˆ = N¯ ∪ {µ(i)} and
Rˆ ∈ RNˆ is the reduction of R˜ to Nˆ , i.e., Rˆ = R˜|Nˆ . Note that (Nˆ , Rˆ) is solvable.13 By resource
sensitivity, for all µˆ ∈ ϕ(Nˆ , Rˆ) there exists µ¯ ∈ ϕ(N¯ , R¯) such that for all i′, j′ ∈ N¯ [possibly
i′ = j′] that were mates at µ¯ at least one is better off. Since ϕ(N¯ , R¯) = {ν¯} was unanimously
best and no agent k ∈ N¯ prefers the newcomer µ(i) to his match ν¯(k), by resource sensitivity,
ϕ(Nˆ , Rˆ) = {νˆ} where νˆ is such that for all k ∈ N¯ , νˆ(k) = ν¯(k) and νˆ(µ(i)) = µ(i).
If µ(j) ∈ N \ {j}, consider the extension (N, R˜) of (Nˆ , Rˆ). Recall that (N, R˜) is solvable.
By resource sensitivity, for all µ˜ ∈ ϕ(N, R˜) there exists µˆ ∈ ϕ(Nˆ , Rˆ) such that for all i′, j′ ∈ Nˆ
[possibly i′ = j′] that were mates at µˆ at least one is better off. Since agents i and j are
mutually best and ϕ(Nˆ , Rˆ) = {νˆ} with νˆ(i) = j, by resource sensitivity, for all µ˜ ∈ ϕ(N, R˜),
µ˜(i) = j; contradicting µ ∈ ϕ(N, R˜).
Lemma 5.
(a) On the class of solvable roommate markets, mutually best and Maskin monotonicity
imply individual rationality.
(b) On the class of all roommate markets, mutually best and Maskin monotonicity imply
individual rationality.
13Roommate market (Nˆ , Rˆ) has a unique core allocation that matches agent i with agent j and all agents
in Nˆ \ {i, j, µ(i)} according to µ – agent µ(i) is single.
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Proof. Assume that ϕ satisfies mutually best and Maskin monotonicity, but not individual
rationality. Thus, there exists a (solvable) roommate market (N,R), a matching µ ∈ ϕ(N,R),
and an agent i ∈ N such that i Pi µ(i).
We define R˜ ∈ RN by moving i on top of agent i’s preferences and, for any j 6= i, by
moving µ(j) on top of agent j’s preferences, i.e., R˜i = Rii and for all j ∈ N \ {i}, R˜j = Rµ(j)j .
Note that (N, R˜) is solvable14 and that R˜ is a Maskin monotonic transformation of R at µ.
Hence, by Maskin monotonicity, µ ∈ ϕ(N, R˜). Let µ˜ be the matching obtained from µ by
unmatching agents i and µ(i). By mutually best, ϕ(N, R˜) = {µ˜}. Since µ˜ 6= µ this is a
contradiction to µ ∈ ϕ(N, R˜).
3.2 Two Characterizations of the Core and two Impossibilities
Lemma 6.
(a) On the class of solvable roommate markets, if a solution ϕ is mutually best and Maskin
monotonic, then it is a subsolution of the core, i.e., for all roommate markets (N,R),
ϕ(N,R) ⊆ core(N,R).
(b) On the class of all roommate markets, no solution ϕ is mutually best and Maskin mono-
tonic.
Proof. Assume that ϕ satisfies mutually best and Maskin monotonicity. By Lemma 5, ϕ
satisfies individual rationality.
To prove (a), suppose that there exists a solvable roommate market (N,R) such that
ϕ(N,R) * core(N,R). To prove (b), let (N,R) be an unsolvable roommate market. In both
cases there exists a matching µ ∈ ϕ(N,R) with a blocking pair {i, j} for µ. By individual
rationality, i 6= j.
We define R˜ ∈ RN by moving j on top of agent i’s preferences, by moving i on top of agent
j’s preferences and, for any k ∈ N \ {i, j}, by moving µ(k) on top of agent k’s preferences,
i.e., R˜i = R
j
i , R˜j = R
i
j , and for all k ∈ N \ {i, j}, R˜k = Rµ(k)k . Note that (N, R˜) is solvable15
and that R˜ is a Maskin monotonic transformation of R at µ. Hence, by Maskin monotonicity,
µ ∈ ϕ(N, R˜). By mutually best, for all µ˜ ∈ ϕ(N, R˜), µ˜(i) = j. Since µ(i) 6= j this is a
contradiction to µ ∈ ϕ(N, R˜).
For (a) this proves that ϕ(N,R) ⊆ core(N,R) and for (b) this proves that mutually best
and Maskin monotonicity are not compatible on the general domain of roommate markets.
Lemma 7. On the class of solvable roommate markets, there exists no Maskin monotonic
strict subsolution of the core.
Proof. So¨nmez’s (1996, Theorem 1) result (which also applies for roommate markets) states
that if a rule ϕ is Pareto optimal, individually rational, and Maskin monotonic, then it is a
supersolution of the core, i.e., for all roommate markets (N,R), ϕ(N,R) ⊇ core(N,R). Thus,
since any subsolution of the core satisfies Pareto optimality and individual rationality, there
exists no Maskin monotonic strict subsolution of the core.
14Roommate market (N, R˜) has a unique core allocation that matches all agents in N \ {i, µ(i)} according
to µ – agents i and µ(i) are single.
15Roommate market (N, R˜) has a unique core allocation that matches agent i with agent j and all agents
in N \ {i, j, µ(i), µ(j)} according to µ – agent(s) µ(i) and µ(j) are either single or, if mutually acceptable,
matched with each other.
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Theorem 1. Two Characterizations of the Core
On the class of solvable roommate markets,
(a) a solution ϕ satisfies unanimity, Maskin monotonicity, and competition sensitivity if
and only if it equals the core;
(b) a solution ϕ satisfies unanimity, Maskin monotonicity, and resource sensitivity if and
only if it equals the core.
Proof. We consider the class of solvable roommate markets.
By Propositions 1 and 2, the core satisfies all properties listed in the theorem.
(a) Let ϕ satisfy unanimity, Maskin monotonicity, and competition sensitivity. Then, by
Lemma 3 (a), ϕ satisfies mutually best.
(b) Let ϕ satisfy unanimity, Maskin monotonicity, and resource sensitivity. Then, by Lemma 4
(a), ϕ satisfies mutually best.
Thus, ϕ satisfies Maskin monotonicity and mutually best. Hence, by Lemma 6 (a), ϕ is a
subsolution of the core. Since on the class of solvable roommate markets no Maskin monotonic
strict subsolution of the core exists (Lemma 7), it follows that ϕ = core.
Theorem 2. Two Impossibility Results
On the class of all roommate markets,
(a) no solution ϕ satisfies unanimity, Maskin monotonicity, and competition sensitivity;
(b) no solution ϕ satisfies unanimity, Maskin monotonicity, and resource sensitivity.
Proof. We consider the class of all roommate markets.
(a) Let ϕ satisfy unanimity, Maskin monotonicity, and competition sensitivity. Then, by
Lemma 3 (b), ϕ satisfies mutually best.
(b) Let ϕ satisfy unanimity, Maskin monotonicity, and resource sensitivity. Then, by
Lemma 4 (b), ϕ satisfies mutually best.
Thus, ϕ satisfies Maskin monotonicity and mutually best; contradicting Lemma 6 (b).
We next show the independence of properties in Theorem 1.
The solution ϕ˜ that always assigns the matching at which all agents are single satisfies
Maskin monotonicity, competition and resource sensitivity, but not unanimity.
Any strict subsolution of the core satisfies unanimity, competition and resource sensitivity
(Proposition 2), but not Maskin monotonicity (Lemma 7).
The Pareto solution PO satisfies unanimity and Maskin monotonicity, but – as the fol-
lowing two examples demonstrate – neither competition nor resource sensitivity.
Example 2. The Pareto Solution is not Competition Sensitive
Consider the solvable roommate markets (N,R) and (N ′, R′) such that
N = {1, 2} N ′ = {1, 2, 3}
R1 : 1, 2 R′1 : 1, 2, 3
R2 : 1, 2 R′2 : 3, 1, 2
R′3 : 2, 3, 1
core(N,R) = {µ¯} core(N ′, R′) = {µ′}
µ¯ = (1, 2) µ′ = (1, 3, 2)
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Let µ = (2, 1). Then, PO(N,R) = {µ, µ¯} and PO(N ′, R′) = {µ′}. Thus, for µ ∈ PO(N,R)
there exists µ′ ∈ PO(N ′, R′) such that agent 1 is newly self matched at µ′ and better off.
Hence, PO violates competition sensitivity. 
Example 3. The Pareto Solution is not Resource Sensitive
Consider the solvable roommate markets (N,R) and (N ′, R′) such that
N = {1} N ′ = {1, 2}
R1 : 1 R′1 : 1, 2
R′2 : 1, 2
core(N,R) = {µ} core(N ′, R′) = {µ¯}
µ = (1) µ¯ = (1, 2)
Let µ′ = (2, 1). Then, PO(N,R) = {µ} and PO(N ′, R′) = {µ′, µ¯}. Thus, for µ′ ∈ PO(N ′, R′)
there exists µ ∈ PO(N,R) such that agent 1 was self matched at µ and is worse off at µ′.
Hence, PO violates resource sensitivity. 
Finally, we briefly discuss the relation between both sensitivity conditions. Proposition 2
implies that competition and resource sensitivity are equivalent under stability. The following
two solutions demonstrate that competition and resource sensitivity are logically independent.
Let ϕˆ be the solution that always assigns the matching where all mutually best agents are
mates and everybody else is single.
The following solution ϕCS satisfies competition sensitivity, but not resource sensitivity.
For all solvable roommate markets (N,R),
ϕCS(N,R) =
{
S(N,R) if 1 6∈ N,
ϕˆ(N,R) if 1 ∈ N.
The following solution ϕRS satisfies resource sensitivity, but not competition sensitivity.
For all solvable roommate markets (N,R),
ϕRS(N,R) =
{
ϕˆ(N,R) if 1 6∈ N,
S(N,R) if 1 ∈ N.
3.3 Marriage Market Results
Because we can easily adjust our proofs for the class of marriage markets,16 our results imply
one of Toda’s results.
Corollary 1. (Toda, 2006, Theorem 3.1)
On the class of marriage markets, the core is the unique solution satisfying weak unanimity,
own-side population monotonicity, and Maskin monotonicity.
Finally, our results imply a new characterization of the core for marriage markets.
Corollary 2.
On the class of marriage markets, the core is the unique solution satisfying weak unanimity,
other-side population monotonicity, and Maskin monotonicity.
16One only has to carefully choose the gender of newcomers in proofs.
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Appendix
A Solution ϕ¯ is not Population Monotonic
Definition 12. Solution ϕ¯
We denote the single-valued solution that assigns to any marriage market its man-optimal
[woman-optimal] stable matching by ϕM [ϕW ]. Then, for all marriage markets (N,R),
ϕ¯(N,R) =
{
ϕM (N,R) if maxN is a man,
ϕW (N,R) if maxN is a woman.
In order to guarantee that ϕ¯ 6= ϕW [ϕM ], we assume that there exist women w1, w2 ∈ N and
men m1,m2 ∈ N such that w1 < m1 and m2 < w2 (otherwise we relabel the agents in order
to define ϕ¯ 6= ϕW [ϕM ]).
Proposition 3. On the class of marriage markets, solution ϕ¯ is individually rational, com-
petition and resource sensitive, but neither own-side nor other-side population monotonic.
Proof. Since ϕ¯ is a stable solution, it satisfies individual rationality and both sensitivity
conditions (Proposition 2). The following examples demonstrate that ϕ¯ is neither own-side
nor other-side population monotonic. Assume that agents 1,2, and 5 are men and agents 3
and 4 are women and consider roommate markets (N,R) and (N ′, R′) such that
N = {1, 2, 3, 4} N ′ = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}
R1 : 3, 4, 1, 2 R′1 : 3, 4, 1, 2, 5
R2 : 4, 3, 2, 1 R′2 : 4, 3, 2, 1, 5
R3 : 2, 1, 3, 4 R′3 : 2, 1, 3, 4, 5
R4 : 1, 2, 4, 3 R′4 : 1, 2, 4, 3, 5
R′5 : 5, . . .
ϕ¯(N,R) = {µ¯} ϕ¯(N ′, R′) = {µ′}
µ¯ = (4, 3, 2, 1) µ′ = (3, 4, 1, 2, 5)
At marriage market (N,R) woman 4 determines that the woman-optimal stable matching is
chosen at ϕ¯(N,R) and man 1 is matched to woman 4 – his second choice. At marriage market
(N ′, R′), man 5 causes a switch to the man-optimal stable matching at ϕ¯(N ′, R′) and man
1 is now matched to woman 3 – his first choice. This is a violation of own-side population
monotonicity. On the other hand, at marriage market (N,R) woman 3 is matched to man 2
– her first choice. At marriage market (N ′, R′), woman 3 is matched to man 1 – her second
choice. This is a violation of other-side population monotonicity.
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B Straightforward Extensions of Population Monotonicity for
Roommate Markets
Definition 13. Own-Side Population Monotonicity (?)
A solution ϕ is own-side population monotonic (?) if the following holds. Let (N,R) be a
roommate market and assume that (N ′, R′), N ′ = N ∪ {n}, is an extension of (N,R) and
U(N ′, R′, n) denotes the agents inN that find agent n unacceptable. Then, for all µ ∈ ϕ(N,R)
there exists µ′ ∈ ϕ(N ′, R′) such that for all i ∈ U(N ′, R′, n), µ(i)Ri µ′(i).
Definition 14. Other-Side Population Monotonicity (?)
A solution ϕ is other-side population monotonic (?) if the following holds. Let (N,R) be a
roommate market and assume that (N ′, R′), N ′ = N ∪ {n}, is an extension of (N,R) and
A(N ′, R′, n) denotes the agents in N that find agent n acceptable. Then, for all µ′ ∈ ϕ(N ′, R′)
there exists µ ∈ ϕ(N,R) such that for all i ∈ A(N ′, R′, n), µ′(i)Ri µ(i).
Proposition 4. On the class of all roommate markets, no solution ϕ satisfies Pareto opti-
mality, mutually best, and own-side population monotonicity (?) [other-side population mono-
tonicity (?)].
Proof. Let solution ϕ satisfy Pareto optimality and mutually best. Consider roommate mar-
kets (N,R) and (N ′, R′) such that
N = {1, 2, 3} N ′ = {1, 2, 3, 4}
R1 : 2, 1, 3 R′1 : 2, 1, 3, 4
R2 : 3, 1, 2 R′2 : 4, 3, 1, 2
R3 : 2, 3, 1 R′3 : 4, 2, 3, 1
R′4 : 3, 4, . . .
Since ϕ satisfies mutually best, for all µ ∈ ϕ(N,R), µ(2) = 3 and for all µ′ ∈ ϕ(N ′, R′),
µ′(3) = 4. Then, for all µ ∈ ϕ(N,R), µ(1) 6= 2 and by Pareto optimality, µ′(1) = 2. Hence, in
contradiction to own-side population monotonicity (?), agent 1 ∈ U(N ′, R′, 4) always prefers
his mate at (N ′, R′) to that at (N,R). On the other hand, in contradiction to other-side
population monotonicity (?), agent 2 ∈ A(N ′, R′, 4) always prefers his mate at (N,R) to that
at (N ′, R′).
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C Stronger Versions of Lemmas 3 and 4
The following example illustrates the difficulty we would encounter if we drop Maskin mono-
tonicity from the proof of Lemma 3.
Example 4. The following two roommate markets (N,R) and (N¯ , R¯) are possible in the
proof of Lemma 3 if no Maskin monotonic transformation is applied in the beginning of the
proof (we assume µ(i) 6= i and µ(j) = j).
N = {i, µ(i), j, 1, 2, 3} N¯ = N ∪ {k¯}
Ri : j, i, . . . R¯i : j, i, k¯, . . .
Rj : i, j, . . . R¯j : i, j, k¯, . . .
R1 : µ(i), 2, 3, 1, . . . R¯1 : µ(i), 2, 3, 1, k¯, . . .
R2 : 3, 1, 2, . . . R¯2 : 3, 1, 2, k¯, . . .
R3 : 1, 2, 3, . . . R¯3 : 1, 2, 3, k¯, . . .
Rµ(i) : i, 1, µ(i) . . . R¯µ(i) : k¯, i, 1, µ(i), . . .
R¯k¯ : µ(i), k¯, . . .
Note that the roommate market (N,R) is solvable and has a unique core allocation that
matches agent i with agent j, agent µ(i) with agent 1, and agent 2 with agent 3. However,
the roommate market (N¯ , R¯) that resulted by adding newcomer k¯ as in the proof of Lemma 3
is not solvable: at any stable matching agent i should be matched with agent j and agent
µ(i) should be matched with agent k¯. However, then there exists a “roommate cycle” for the
remaining agents 1, 2, and 3 – they can never be matched in a stable way. 
Next, we illustrate the difficulty we would encounter if we drop Maskin monotonicity from
the proof of Lemma 4.
Example 5. The following two roommate markets (N,R) and (N¯ , R¯) are possible in the
proof of Lemma 4 if no Maskin monotonic transformation is applied in the beginning of the
proof (we assume µ(i) 6= i and µ(j) = j).
N = {i, µ(i), j, 1, 2, 3} N¯ = N \ {µ(i)}
Ri : j, i, . . . R¯i : j, i, . . .
Rj : i, j, . . . R¯j : i, j, . . .
R1 : µ(i), 2, 3, 1, . . . R¯1 : 2, 3, 1, . . .
R2 : 3, 1, 2, . . . R¯2 : 3, 1, 2, . . .
R3 : 1, 2, 3, . . . R¯3 : 1, 2, 3, . . .
Rµ(i) : i, 1, µ(i) . . .
Note that the roommate market (N,R) is solvable (see Example 4). However, the roommate
market (N¯ , R¯) that resulted by removing agents µ(i) and µ(j) as in the proof of Lemma 4
is not solvable: at any stable matching agent i should be matched with agent j and as in
Example 4 we are left with a “roommate cycle” for the remaining agents 1, 2, and 3 – they
can never be matched in a stable way. 
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We will use the following weaker unanimity condition to strengthen Lemmas 3 and 4.
Definition 15. Weak Unanimity
Let (N,R) be a roommate market, |N | even, and µ be a complete matching17 such that for all
i, j ∈ N , µ(i)Ri j. Then, µ is the unanimously best complete matching for (N,R). A solution
ϕ is weakly unanimous if it chooses the unanimously best complete matching whenever it
exists, i.e., for all roommate markets (N,R) with an unanimously best complete matching µ,
ϕ(N,R) = {µ}.
Next, we strengthen Lemma 3 in two ways. First, we replace unanimity by weak unanimity
and second, we drop Maskin monotonicity.
Lemma 3’.
(a) On the class of solvable roommate markets, weak unanimity and competition sensitivity
imply mutually best.
(b) On the class of all roommate markets, weak unanimity and competition sensitivity imply
mutually best.
Proof. Assume that ϕ satisfies weak unanimity and competition sensitivity, but not mutually
best. Thus, there exists a (solvable) roommate market (N,R) and a matching µ ∈ ϕ(N,R)
such that for two agents i and j that are mutually best, µ(i) 6= j.
First, if roommate market (N,R) is solvable, we add newcomers in order to guarantee
solvability in later steps. Thus, if (N,R) is solvable then first go to Step 1 and otherwise go
to Step 2 immediately.
Step 1: Guaranteeing Solvability Assume that roommate market (N,R) is solvable and let
µ′ ∈ S(N,R).
Let k1, k2 be such that k1 6= k2 and µ′(k1) = k2. Consider the extension (N1, R1) of
(N,R) that is obtained by adding a newcomer k′1 such that k2 Pk1 k′1 (and for no k ∈ N ,
k2 Pk1 k Pk1 k
′
1) and for all k ∈ N \ {k1}, k1 Pk′1 k′1 Pk′1 k. Note that (N1, R1) is solvable.18
By competition sensitivity, for µ ∈ ϕ(N,R), there exists µ1 ∈ ϕ(N1, R1) such that for all
i′, j′ ∈ N [possibly i′ = j′] that are new mates at µ1 at least one is worse off. Hence, there
exists µ1 ∈ ϕ(N1, R1) such that µ1(i) 6= j (agents i and j are still mutually best at (N1, R1)).
Next, we consider the extension (N2, R2) of (N1, R1) that is obtained by adding a newcomer
k′2 such that k1Pk2 k′2 (and for no k ∈ N , k1Pk2 kPk2 k′2) and for all k ∈ N \{k1}, k2Pk′2 k′2Pk′2 k.
Similarly as before it follows that (N2, R2) is solvable and there exists µ2 ∈ ϕ(N2, R2) such
that µ2(i) 6= j (agents i and j are still mutually best at (N2, R2)).
Note that we add newcomers as described above for all k1, k2 such that k1 6= k2 and
µ′(k1) = k2. This results in a solvable roommate market that for notational convenience we
also denote by (N,R). For this matching market (N,R) there exists a corresponding stable
matching µ′ and a matching µ ∈ ϕ(N,R) such that for two mutually best agents i and j,
µ(i) 6= j. The difference between this roommate market (N,R) and the original market is
that now a newcomer who is added in the sequel will not cause instability because an agent k
who is unmatched by the newcomer from his original stable partner at µ′ can now match in a
stable way with the added agent k′ instead of creating a “roommate cycle” (as in Example 4).
17A matching is complete if it partitions the set of agents into pairs, i.e., it contains no singletons.
18Roommate market (N1, R1) has at least the stable matching where all agents in N are matched according
to µ′ and agent k′1 is single.
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Step 2: Without loss of generality assume that N \ {i, j} = {1, 2, . . . , l}. First, consider the
extension (N1, R1) of (N,R) that is obtained by adding a newcomer k1 such that agents 1 and
k1 are mutually best and k1 is unacceptable for all other agents in {2, . . . , l}. By competition
sensitivity, for µ ∈ ϕ(N,R), there exists µ1 ∈ ϕ(N1, R1) such that for all i′, j′ ∈ N [possibly
i′ = j′] that are new mates at µ1 at least one is worse off. Hence, there exists µ1 ∈ ϕ(N1, R1)
such that µ1(i) 6= j. Note that the pairs {i, j} and {1, k1} consist of mutually best agents.
We continue adding newcomers k2, . . . , kl in a similar fashion and end up with a (solvable)
roommate market (N l, Rl) such that there exists µl ∈ ϕ(N l, Rl) with µl(i) 6= j. Note that at
(N l, Rl) we can partition N l in pairs {i, j}, {1, k1}, . . . , {l, kl} of mutually best agents. Hence,
a unanimously best complete matching ν for (N l, Rl) exists: ν matches agent i with agent
j, agent 1 with agent k1, etc. Hence, by weak unanimity, ϕ(N l, Rl) = {ν}, contradicting
µl ∈ ϕ(N l, Rl).
Finally, we strengthen Lemma 4 by replacing unanimity by weak unanimity. We discuss
the difficulties that occur when dropping Masking monotonicity after the proof.
Lemma 4’.
(a) On the class of solvable roommate markets, weak unanimity, Maskin monotonicity, and
resource sensitivity imply mutually best.
(b) On the class of all roommate markets, weak unanimity, Maskin monotonicity, and re-
source sensitivity imply mutually best.
Proof. Assume that ϕ satisfies weak unanimity, Maskin monotonicity, and resource sensitiv-
ity, but not mutually best. Thus, there exists a (solvable) roommate market (N,R) and a
matching µ ∈ ϕ(N,R) such that agents i and j are mutually best and µ(i) 6= j.
We define R˜ ∈ RN as follows. For any k ∈ N \ {i, j} we define R˜k ∈ L(N) by moving
µ(k) on top of agent k’s preferences, i.e., for all k ∈ N \ {i, j}, R˜k = Rµ(k)k . Let R˜i = Ri and
R˜j = Rj . Note that (N, R˜) is solvable10 and that R˜ is a Maskin monotonic transformation of
R at µ. Hence, by Maskin monotonicity, µ ∈ ϕ(N, R˜), agents i and j are mutually best and
µ(i) 6= j.
Let N¯ = {i, j} and consider the restriction R¯ = R˜N¯ , i.e., i R¯j j and j R¯i i completely
describes R¯. There exists a unanimously best complete matching ν¯ for (N¯ , R¯): ν¯ matches
agent i with agent j. Hence, by weak unanimity, ϕ(N¯ , R¯) = {ν¯}.
Without loss of generality assume that N = N¯ ∪ {1, . . . , l}. First, consider the extension
(N1, R1) of (N¯ , R¯) that is obtained by adding newcomer 1 such that N1 = N¯ ∪ {1} and
R1 = R˜N1 . Note that (N1, R1) is solvable.19 By resource sensitivity, for all µ1 ∈ ϕ(N1, R1),
there exists µ¯ ∈ ϕ(N¯ , R¯) such that µ1(i) = µ¯(i) = j or one of the agents i and j that were
mates at µ¯ is better off. Since ϕ(N¯ , R¯) = {ν¯} was unanimously best and neither agent i nor
agent j prefer the newcomer to his match, by resource sensitivity, ϕ(N1, R1) = {ν1} where ν1
is such that ν1(i) = j and ν1(1) = 1. Second, without loss of generality assume that 2 = µ(1)
and consider the extension (N2, R2) of (N1, R1) that is obtained by adding newcomer 2 such
that N2 = N1∪{2} and R2 = R˜N2 . Note that (N2, R2) is solvable.20 By resource sensitivity,
for all µ2 ∈ ϕ(N2, R2) there exists µ1 ∈ ϕ(N1, R1) such that for all i′, j′ ∈ N1 [possibly i′ = j′]
19Roommate market (N1, R1) has a unique core allocation that matches agent i with agent j – agent 1 is
single.
20Roommate market (N2, R2) has a unique core allocation that matches agent i with agent j and agent 1
with agent 2.
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that were mates at µ1 at least one is better off. Since agents i and j are mutually best and
ϕ(N1, R1) = {ν1} with ν1(i) = j, by resource sensitivity, for all µ2 ∈ ϕ(N2, R2), µ2(i) = j.
We continue adding newcomers 3, . . . , l in a similar fashion and end up with a solvable
roommate market (N l, Rl) such that for all µl ∈ ϕ(N l, Rl), µl(i) = j. Since (N l, Rl) = (N, R˜),
this contradicts µ ∈ ϕ(N, R˜).
Finally we would like to comment why dropping Masking monotonicity is more difficult
when resource sensitivity instead of competition sensitivity is used. Analyzing the proofs of
Lemmas 3 and 4 we can – loosely speaking – say that competition sensitivity allows us to
add agents to a roommate market and that resource sensitivity allows us to remove agents
from a roommate market in order to obtain a roommate market for which unanimity narrows
down the solution to a (weakly) unanimous matching. While it is always possible to create
this unanimous solvable roommate market by adding extra agents (see Proof of Lemma 3’)
it might not be possible to create such a unanimous solvable roommate market by removing
agents one at a time. The following example is a solvable roommate market from which we
cannot remove any agent without destroying solvability.
Example 6. The following two roommate markets (N,R) illustrates the difficulty of dropping
Maskin monotonicity from Lemma 4.
N = {1, 2, 3, 4}
R1 : 2, 3, 4, 1
R2 : 3, 4, 1, 2
R3 : 4, 1, 2, 3
R4 : 1, 2, 3, 4
The unique stable matching for (N,R) matches agents 1 and 3 and agents 2 and 4. Removing
any of the agents creates a “roommate cycle” for the remaining agents and the restricted
roommate market is not solvable. 
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